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YABLO’S PARADOX, THE LIAR,
AND REFERENTIAL CONTRADICTIONS
FROM A GRAPH THEORY POINT OF VIEW
Abstract. 𝐹 -systems are useful digraphs to model sentences that predicate the falsity of other
sentences. Paradoxes like the Liar and the one of Yablo can be analyzed with that tool to
find graph-theoretic patterns. In this paper we studied this general model consisting of a set of
sentences and the binary relation ‘… affirms the falsity of…’ among them. The possible existence
of non-referential sentences was also considered. To model the sets of all the sentences that
can jointly be valued as true we introduced the notion of conglomerate, the existence of which
guarantees the absence of paradox. Conglomerates also enabled us to characterize referential
contradictions, i.e., sentences that can only be false under a classical valuation due to the
interactions with other sentences in the model. A Kripke-style fixed-point characterization of
groundedness was offered, and complete (meaning that every sentence is deemed either true or
false) and consistent (meaning that no sentence is deemed true and false) fixed points were put
in correspondence with conglomerates. Furthermore, argumentation frameworks are special
cases of 𝐹 -systems. We showed the relation between local conglomerates and admissible sets of
arguments and argued about the usefulness of the concept for the argumentation theory.
Keywords: the Liar paradox, Yablo’s paradox, 𝐹 -system, conglomerates, groundedness, argu-
mentation frameworks.
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Rabern, Rabern, Macauley (2013), inspired by Cook (2004), coined the term “𝐹 -
systems” to refer to “sentence systems which are restricted in such a way that all the
sentences can only say that other sentences in the system are false”. So, 𝐹 -systems can
be represented as digraphs that model the interaction among sentences that predicate
falsity of other sentences (call them falsity predicate sentences). An 𝐹 -system is a pair
𝐹 = ⟨𝑆, 𝐹⟩, where 𝑆 is a set of primitive entities called sentences, and 𝐹 is a binary
relation on 𝑆 intended to mean ‘…affirms the falsity of…’. This is the only sense in
which sentences can refer to other sentences in the model. The existence of non-falsity
predicate sentences is also considered (cf. Beringer, Schindler 2017). These can be
referred to by other sentences, but they do not refer to other sentences (i.e. they are
sinks in the digraph).
1Gustavo Bodanza, associate professor, Universiad Nacional del Sur, Argentina.
ccbodanz@criba.edu.ar
Логико-философские штудии. ISSN 2223-3954 101
Gustavo Bodanza. Yablo’s Paradox, The Liar, and Referential Contradictions...
Paradoxes like the Liar and the one of Yablo can be analyzed with that tool to
find graph-theoretic patterns. Paradoxes can be characterized by means of assignment
of truth values in a way such that a sentence is assigned ‘false’ if it refers to some
sentence to which is assigned ‘true’, and it is assigned ‘true’ if all the sentences it refers
to are assigned ‘false’. If a sentence cannot be assigned either ‘true’ or ‘false’, then it
is paradoxical.
I introduce the notion of conglomerate to model maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) subsets of
sentences that can jointly be valued as true. Briefly, a conglomerate is a set of sentences
such that none of its sentences refer to other sentences within the set, and every outer
non-sink sentence refers to some inner sentence. More formally, let ⃖⃖⃖ ⃖⃖ ⃖𝐹 (𝐴) = {𝑥 ∶ (𝑧, 𝑥) ∈
𝐹 for some 𝑧 ∈ 𝐴}. Then:
Definition 1. Given 𝐹 = ⟨𝑆, 𝐹⟩, a conglomerate is a subset 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑆 that satisfies:
1. ⃖⃖⃖ ⃖⃖ ⃖𝐹 (𝐴) ⊆ 𝑆 𝐴 (independence), and
2. (𝑆\𝐴)\𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑠(𝑆) ⊆ ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖ ⃖𝐹 (𝐴) (non-sinks absorption)
The existence of conglomerates in a system guarantees the absence of paradox—
at least, those generated by the falsity predicate. The Liar paradox, for instance,
can be represented as an 𝐹 -system ⟨{𝑎}, {(𝑎, 𝑎)}⟩ (i.e., 𝑎 expresses its own falsity).
Yablo’s paradox, in turn, can be represented as ⟨{𝑎𝑘}𝑘∈ℕ, {(𝑎𝑘, 𝑎𝑚)}𝑘<𝑚⟩ (i.e. an infinite
sequence of sentences, each one referring to the falsity of each later sentence). There
are no conglomerates in any of those settings.
The notion of conglomerate extends that of kernel used by Cook (2004). Kernels
are such that all external sentences refer to some internal sentence. Kernels are suitable
for capturing classical truth values assignments in systems where each sentence refers
to some other sentence. But kernels do not fit well in systems that include sinks. The
reason is that sinks always belong to every kernel and, in consequence, kernels can
only model them as true. But sinks are intended to represent sentences of varied truth
values, like ‘Snow is white’ or ‘It rains in Moscow right now’. For example, in a system
with only two sentences, ‘It rains in Moscow right now’ and ‘It is false that it rains
in Moscow right now’ (i.e., the latter affirms the falsity of the first one), we will have
two conglomerates, each containing only one of the sentences, representing the fact
that either one of them is true and the other one false, or vice versa; however, we will
only have one kernel containing ‘It rains in Moscow right now’, which only enables to
interpret that sentence as true, and the other one as false.
Since paradoxical 𝐹 -systems have no conglomerates, this notion is not well-defined.
However, we can still want to know what sentences can be true together in sys-
tems containing paradoxes, even if that class is empty. Possibly true sentences can
be captured by defining a local version of the non-sinks absorption condition. Let
⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗𝐹 (𝐴) = {𝑥 ∶ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ 𝐹 for some 𝑧 ∈ 𝐴}. Then:
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Definition 2. Given 𝐹 = ⟨𝑆, 𝐹⟩, a local conglomerate is a subset 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑆 that satisfies:
1. ⃖⃖⃖ ⃖⃖ ⃖𝐹 (𝐴) ⊆ 𝑆 𝐴, and
2. ⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗𝐹 (𝐴)\𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑠(𝑆) ⊆ ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖ ⃖𝐹 (𝐴).
Since the empty set is always a local conglomerate, the notion is well defined.
Paradoxical sentences cannot belong to any local conglomerate, nor can they refer to
sentences that belong to any local conglomerate (otherwise, they could be consistently
assigned the false truth value and, hence, they would be not paradoxical).
Besides paradoxes, local conglomerates also allow to characterize referential contra-
dictions and referential tautologies. Referential contradictions (resp. tautologies) are
sentences that can only take the false (resp. true) value under classical valuations, due
to the interactions with other sentences in the model. For example, assume 𝑝 refers
to both 𝑞 and 𝑟, and 𝑞 refers to 𝑟. Then 𝑝 is a referential contradiction, since it can
only have the false value in every classical (i.e. binary) valuation. For their part, ref-
erential tautologies only exist by reference to referential contradictions (for example,
a sentence 𝑠 referring to 𝑝 in the above scenario). As a result, referential tautologies
belong to every maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) local conglomerate while referential contradictions
are excluded from them. But referential contradictions, unlike paradoxical sentences,
are “absorbed” by every maximal local conglomerate.
Transitivity is a source of pathologies in 𝐹 -systems. It is a sufficient condition for
referential contradictions in non-paradoxical scenarios, while it is sufficient for paradox
in sink-free systems—as shown by Cook. Another source of problems is odd-length
cycles, which lead to paradox whenever the sentences in the cycle are not “absorbed”
by local conglomerates. While Yablo’s paradox suffers from the transitivity related
pathology, the Liar is doubly pathological, since it suffers both the transitivity and the
odd-length cycle conditions.
Finally, maximal local conglomerates can be put in correspondence with maximal
consistent fixed points of a Kripke-style “jump” operator. A partial set is a pair (𝑆+, 𝑆−),
where 𝑆+ is intended to contain only true sentences while 𝑆− is intended to contain
only false sentences. I define an operator 𝜙 which applied to a partial set (𝑆+, 𝑆−)
returns another partial set (𝑆′+, 𝑆′−), where 𝑆′+ collects all the sinks in 𝑆+ together
with the sentences whose references are all contained in 𝑆−, and 𝑆′− collects all the
sinks in 𝑆− together with the sentences whose references are some contained in 𝑆+.
When 𝜙 returns the same partial set, we have a fixed point. Fixed points are consistent
if no sentence is in both sets of the pair.
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